

Russian Election Interventions, 1991-2018
Codebook

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Introduction

This codebook provides evidence of Russian¹ interference in foreign elections² since 1991. Cases are arranged in reverse chronological order, with the most recent interventions beginning the codebook. We restrict our analysis to interventions in *elections*, rather than Russian interference in foreign political systems more generally (i.e., hacking of non-electoral targets such as defense establishments, the power grid, etc., or other forms of espionage). As such, we restrict our analysis to interference leading up to and during national elections.

This analysis uses publicly available evidence to catalogue all such attempts to the best extent possible. We use a variety of sources to gather this information. Most frequently we rely on articles from reputable news organizations. We also consult publicly available U.S. government publications and assessments from a variety of sources, including the U.S. Senate and U.S. intelligence agencies. Finally, we consult a variety of congressional testimonies by experts, think tank reports, and scholarly publications. Of course, given the covert nature of these interventions, the strong denials by Russian government officials³, and the uneven media attention to each intervention, missing information remains an important limitation. All sources consulted are cited in footnotes throughout the codebook.

After providing evidence of Russian interference and discussing the election outcome, we provide an admittedly subjective assessment of the extent to which the outcome is favorable to Russian government interests and the plausibility of a Russian impact on this outcome.

Earlier versions of this analysis have appeared in a policy memo for a conference at Stanford University in November 2017⁴, an article in the Monkey Cage blog at the *Washington Post*⁵, and a policy memo for PONARS Eurasia.⁶

This codebook has been expanded from our earlier codebook⁷ to include cases from 2018. We also reassessed cases included in the earlier analysis in light of recent revelations. This version is up to date as of February 24, 2019. For questions on the codebook, please contact [Adam E. Casey](#).

¹We are only focused on Russian state-led or state-directed interference, rather than interference by private individuals.

²We include national referenda.

³“*Putin: Rossiya ne vmeshivalas’ v vibori v SShA i Frantsii.*” May 30, 2017. *Vedomosti*; “*Putin: Rossiya ne vmeshivalas’ v amerikanskiye viborniye protsessi.*” July 16, 2018. *TASS*.

⁴Lucan Ahmad Way and Adam Casey. 2017. “[Is Russia a Threat to Western Democracy? Russian Intervention in Foreign Elections, 1991-2017.](#)” Memo for *Global Populisms as a Threat to Democracy?* November 3 (Stanford, C.A.: Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University).

⁵Lucan Ahmad Way and Adam Casey. “[Russia has been meddling in foreign elections for decades. Has it made a difference?](#)” January 8, 2018. *Washington Post* (Monkey Cage).

⁶Lucan Ahmad Way and Adam Casey. 2018. “[Russian Foreign Election Interventions since 1991](#)” (Washington, D.C.: Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia, The George Washington University).

⁷Adam Casey and Lucan Ahmad Way. 2017. “[Russian Electoral Interventions, 1991-2017.](#)” Scholars Portal Dataverse.

2018

United States

DATE: November 6, 2018

ELECTION TYPE: Midterm election.

RESULTS: Democratic Party wins control of House of Representatives and the Republican Party gains two seats in the Senate.⁸

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The election saw the victory of the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives despite a disadvantage due to partisan gerrymandering.⁹

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Leading up to the midterm elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign. Russian interference in the midterm elections was confirmed by then-U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis.¹⁰ Former Deputy National Security adviser Nadia Schadlow stated that “Russia has used internet trolls and bots to spread disinformation through ads on Facebook and other social media platforms.”¹¹ The *New York Times* reported that current and former U.S. officials have stated that Russian disinformation campaigns have continued, and are “aimed at sowing dissent, polarizing the political parties, and setting the stage for the 2020 presidential election.”¹² Ahead of the elections, the U.S. Justice Department filed charges against Russian citizen Elena Khusyaynova, alleging she conspired to interfere in the 2018 U.S. election.¹³ Khusyaynova is alleged to have managed a multimillion dollar budget for a disinformation campaign in the midterms.¹⁴ Officials at Facebook confirmed that Russian “trolls” were active on Facebook and Instagram before the midterms.¹⁵ Before the elections,

⁸Derek Watkins, K. K. Rebecca Lai, Larry Buchanan and Karen Yourish. 2018. “[Sizing Up the 2018 Blue Wave.](#)” November 7, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁹Maggie Astor and K. K. Rebecca Lai. “[What’s Stronger Than a Blue Wave? Gerrymandered Districts.](#)” November 29, 2018. *New York Times*; Nate Cohn. “[Why Democrats’ Gain Was More Impressive than it Appears.](#)” November 7, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹⁰Phil Stewart. “[Pentagon Chief Slams ‘Slow Learner’ Putin over Election Meddling.](#)” December 1, 2018. *Reuters*.

¹¹Lara Seligman. “[Mattis Confirms Russia Interfered in U.S. Midterm Elections.](#)” December 1, 2018. *Foreign Policy*.

¹²Julian E. Barnes. “[U.S. Begins First Cyberoperation Against Russia Aimed at Protecting Elections.](#)” October 23, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹³Matt Zapotosky, Rachel Weiner, Ellen Nakashima and Devlin Barrett. “[Justice Dept. Charges Russian Woman with Interference in Midterm Elections.](#)” October 19, 2018. *Washington Post*. The supporting affidavit cites an FBI investigation which connects Khusyaynova to “Operation Lakhta,” a Russian-influence campaign beginning in 2014, targeting Russian citizens, the U.S., members of the EU, and Ukraine. This campaign’s “stated goal in the United States was to spread distrust towards candidates for political office and the political system in general.” “Operation Lakhta” used a variety of subsidiary organizations, and was funded by Putin-ally Evgeny Prigozhin. On Prigozhin, see Denis Korotkov. “*Povar lyubit poostreye: Pochemu s vragami i opponentami Yevgeniya Prigozhina sluchayutcyta heschat’ya. Istoriya neskol’kikh provokatsiy.*” October 21, 2018. *Novaya Gazeta*.

¹⁴Adam Goldman. “[Justice Dept. Accuses Russians of Interfering in Midterm Elections.](#)” October 19, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹⁵Sheera Frenkel and Mike Isaac. “[Russian Trolls Were at it Again Before Midterms, Facebook Says.](#)” November 7, 2018. *New York Times*.

the U.S. Cyber Command launched its first publicly known operation against Russian operatives in an attempt to deter them from spreading disinformation.¹⁶ Unlike the 2016 election, this operation “did not seem to include any outright hacking efforts.”¹⁷ In a joint statement, the U.S. intelligence community stated that “we do not have any evidence of a compromise or disruption of infrastructure that would enable adversaries to prevent voting, change vote counts or disrupt our ability to tally votes in the midterm elections.”¹⁸

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: GOP victory.

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹⁹

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.²⁰

Bosnia

DATE: October 6, 2018.

ELECTION TYPE: General elections.

RESULTS: Bosnian Serb nationalist Milorad Dodik and Muslim Bosniak Sefik Dzaferovic won the Serb and Bosniak seats in the triumvirate presidency, respectfully. Moderate Croat Zelko Komsic won the Croat seat over the nationalist candidate, Dragan Covic from the largest Croat party. Turnout was 53.5%.²¹

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: General elections included presidential elections for the triumvirate presidency (a system of ethnic-power sharing).

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Leading up to the general elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign. Russia is “deeply engaged in local language media, both with Kremlin-owned websites like Sputnik and with bots that harp on local grievances.”²² Russian government officials denied allegations of interference ahead of the vote.²³

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Strengthen nationalists, prevent possible future EU or NATO

¹⁶Julian E. Barnes. “[U.S. Begins First Cyberoperation Against Russia Aimed at Protecting Elections.](#)” October 23, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹⁷Matt Zapposky, Rachel Weiner, Ellen Nakashima and Devlin Barrett. “[Justice Dept. Charges Russian Woman with Interference in Midterm Elections.](#)” October 19, 2018. *Washington Post*.

¹⁸Director of National Intelligence. Press Release. “[Joint Statement from the ODNI, DOJ, FBI, and DHS: Combating Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections.](#)” October 19, 2018. Washington, D.C.

¹⁹The Russian disinformation campaign was aimed at bolstering the message of the GOP.

²⁰While it is perhaps too early to assess the effect of Russian disinformation on the 2018 midterm elections given the limited knowledge of its scope or content, as with the 2016 intervention the disinformation campaign utilized existing themes already embraced by mainstream parties.

²¹Maja Zuvella and Daria Sito-Sucic. “[Nationalist Serb, Bosniak Leaders win Bosnia’s Presidential Vote.](#)” October 7, 2018. *Reuters*.

²²Steven Erlanger. “[In a New Cold War With Russia, Balkans Become a Testing Ground.](#)” April 10, 2018. *New York Times*.

²³“[Lavrov Denies Russian Interference in Bosnian Affairs During Visit to Republika Srpska.](#)” September 22, 2018. *RFE/RL*.

membership.²⁴

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.²⁵

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.²⁶

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.²⁷

Macedonia

DATE: September 30, 2018.

ELECTION TYPE: Referendum on renaming country North Macedonia.

RESULTS: 90% approve of name change, but fails to reach required 50% turnout threshold. Prime Minister Zaev nevertheless urges parliament to adopt the measure.²⁸

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The referendum on changing Macedonia's name to the Republic of North Macedonia sought to end a dispute with Greece (over its own region named Macedonia). If Macedonia changed its name, Greece offered "to end its objections to Macedonia's EU and NATO membership bids."²⁹ On January 11, 2019, parliament agreed to officially change the name to North Macedonia with the support of NATO and the EU.³⁰

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign and possibly financed protests ahead of the referendum. Shortly before the referendum, then U.S.-Defense Secretary Mattis accused Russia of interfering in the referendum through the transferring of money and "conducting broader influence campaigns."³¹ In July 2018, "Greece expelled two

²⁴"Wary of Russian meddling, the European Union is holding out a renewed prospect of membership to Bosnia and to the other five nations of the Western Balkans - Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo - in return for fundamental structural reform." Steven Erlanger. "In a New Cold War With Russia, Balkans Become a Testing Ground." April 10, 2018. *New York Times*; Barbara Surk. "Bosnia's Election Exacerbates Old Divisions, to Russia's Satisfaction." October 6, 2018. *New York Times*.

²⁵There is some circumstantial evidence Dodik was Russia's preferred candidate. During a September visit to Bosnia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Republika Srpska President Dodik who later won the Serb seat. "Earlier, local analysts had speculated that Lavrov's visit was timed to lend support to Dodik's candidacy. In August, the Serbian newspaper Vecernje Novosti wrote that Russia might back an independence bid by Republika Srpska." "Lavrov Denies Russian Interference in Bosnian Affairs During Visit to Republika Srpska." September 22, 2018. *RFE/RL*. Russian President Putin has met with Dodik eight times since 2011. Barbara Surk. "Bosnia's Election Exacerbates Old Divisions, to Russia's Satisfaction." October 6, 2018. *New York Times*.

²⁶Nationalists were already popular and ruling each seat in the triumvirate.

²⁷The nationalist Croat candidate actually lost to the more moderate Komsic. Incumbent Dodik has long been pro-Russia. Bosniak nationalist Dzaferovic was the candidate of the largest Muslim Bosniak party, the Party of Democratic Action. Barbara Surk. "Bosnia's Election Exacerbates Old Divisions, to Russia's Satisfaction." October 6, 2018. *New York Times*.

²⁸"Macedonia Referendum: PM Vows to go Ahead with Name Change." October 1, 2018. *BBC News*.

²⁹"Macedonia Referendum: Name Change Vote Fails to Reach Threshold." October 1, 2018. *BBC News*.

³⁰Aleksandar Dimishkovski and Marc Santora. "Macedonia Votes to Change Its Name, Taking Step to End Dispute With Greece." January 11, 2019. *New York Times*; Lefteris Papadimas and George Georgiopoulos. "After Years of Stalling, Greece OKs Macedonia in NATO." February 8, 2019. *Reuters*.

³¹Idrees Ali. "U.S. Defense Secretary warns of Russian Meddling in Macedonia's Referendum." September 17, 2018. *Reuters*.

Russian diplomats and barred two other people from entering the country for trying to bribe officials and foment demonstrations to thwart the deal with Macedonia.”³² “[H]ooligans connected to a Macedonian soccer team owned by a wealthy Russian businessman. . . told local media they had been paid to stir up violence during anti-name-change protests in Skopje in June.”³³ Ahead of the referendum, “a fleet of new websites spread calls to boycott the vote and Russia’s ambassador in Skopje warned that the country could become ‘a legitimate target’ if tensions increased between Russia and NATO.”³⁴ Ahead of the vote, “scores of Facebook posts are urging voters to burn their ballots. Hundreds of new websites are calling for a boycott. And one news article, widely shared online, warns that Google may eliminate Macedonian from its list of recognized languages, depending on the vote.”³⁵

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Prevent NATO and EU membership.³⁶

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Partial.³⁷

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.³⁸

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Medium.³⁹

Montenegro

DATE: April 15, 2018

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential elections.

³²Idrees Ali. “U.S. Defense Secretary warns of Russian Meddling in Macedonia’s Referendum.” September 17, 2018. *Reuters*.

³³Michael Birnbaum. “Russia and the West Battle over Macedonia’s Future Ahead of Name-change Referendum.” September 28, 2018. *Washington Post*.

³⁴Michael Birnbaum. “Russia and the West Battle over Macedonia’s Future Ahead of Name-change Referendum.” September 28, 2018. *Washington Post*.

³⁵Marc Santora and Julian E. Barnes. “In the Balkans, Russia and the West Fight a Disinformation-Age Battle.” September 16, 2018. *New York Times*.

³⁶“Russian officials have broadly denied that they are trying to affect the outcome of European elections. But Russian diplomats have made no secret of their opposition to further NATO expansion, arguing that it would destabilize the Balkans.” Marc Santora and Julian E. Barnes. “In the Balkans, Russia and the West Fight a Disinformation-Age Battle.” September 16, 2018. *New York Times*.

³⁷Referendum fails to reach 50% threshold, though parliament still approves measure. But, “[a]ccording to Western officials, Moscow’s primary goal is to depress turnout. If less than half of registered voters participate in the referendum, the issue is forced back to Parliament, undermining the popular mandate for a solution.” Marc Santora and Julian E. Barnes. “In the Balkans, Russia and the West Fight a Disinformation-Age Battle.” September 16, 2018. *New York Times*.

³⁸The name change was opposed by VMRO-DPMNE, the former ruling party.

³⁹Given its high public support, it is possible Russian disinformation depressed turnout. However, major opposition parties also supported a No vote. Ahead of the referendum, 83% of citizens supported joining the EU and 77% joining NATO but the former ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE opposed the name change. Michael Birnbaum. “Russia and the West Battle over Macedonia’s Future Ahead of Name-change Referendum.” September 28, 2018. *Washington Post*; Eleanor Rose. “Macedonia’s Parliament Backs Name Change.” January 11, 2019. *Politico*. Simon Tisdall writes that “[a]s elsewhere in Europe, Russia’s influence campaign in Macedonia exploited and complemented rightwing nationalist-populist narratives based on notions of identity, race and the perceived threat of an overbearing EU. And it remains unclear whether Moscow’s actions tipped the balance.” “Result of Macedonia’s Referendum is Another Victory for Russia.” October 1, 2018. *The Guardian*

RESULTS: Victory by pro-EU former PM Milo Djukanovic over Mladen Bojanic, backed by a coalition including some favoring closer ties with Russia. Djukanovic won over 54% of the vote (avoiding runoff) to Bojanic's 33%.⁴⁰

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Pro-EU, NATO former Prime Minister from the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists faced Bojanic who was backed by a coalition of opposition groups including those that supported closer ties with Russia.⁴¹

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of the presidential elections, Russia engaged in cyberattacks. In the run up to the April elections, "authorities in Montenegro have recorded a sharp rise in cyberattacks, mostly targeting state institutions and media outlets."⁴²

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Undermine pro-NATO government, prevent EU membership.⁴³

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.⁴⁴

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.⁴⁵

Italy

DATE: March 4, 2018.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary elections.

RESULTS: A plurality was won by the "anti-system" Five Star Movement (M5S) with over 32% of the vote, and the "hard right" Northern League (LN) won 17.5%.⁴⁶ The establishment center-left suffered its worst performance since 1992, with the ruling Democratic Party (PD) receiving 18.7% of the vote.⁴⁷ The fairly traditional center-right party, Forza Italia, was overtaken by the nationalist Northern League, and the radical right party Fratelli d'Italia gained seats with 4.35% of the vote.⁴⁸ In May, the Five Star Movement and the League

⁴⁰Predrag Milic. "Djukanovic Vows EU Path after Sweeping Montenegro Vote." April 15, 2018. *Associated Press*; "Djukanovic Celebrates Election Victory in Montenegro." April 16, 2018. *RFE/RL*.

⁴¹Predrag Milic. "Djukanovic Vows EU Path after Sweeping Montenegro Vote." April 15, 2018. *Associated Press*.

⁴²Alan Crosby. "Montenegro Seeks to Stare Down Fancy Bear as Election Looms." March 17, 2018. *RFE/RL*.

⁴³The EU has "gone on record to say that if all goes well, Serbia and Montenegro, the only two countries now engaged in an accession process and hence the front-runners, could join by 2025." Steven Erlanger. "In a New Cold War With Russia, Balkans Become a Testing Ground." April 10, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁴⁴The largest opposition bloc, the Democratic Front, is pro-Russia and opposed to joining NATO.

⁴⁵The DPS party won elections and NATO accession despite split public opinion and the presence of pro-Russia opposition parties organized in the Democratic Front. Dusica Tomovic. "Anti-NATO Groups Demand Referendum in Montenegro." February 10, 2017. *Balkan Insight*; Ivana Sekularac. "End of the Affair: Montenegro Jilts Russia by Joining NATO." May 22, 2017. *Reuters*; "NATO Anniversary Highlights Divisions in Montenegro." June 5, 2018. *Balkan Insight*.

⁴⁶Jason Horowitz. "In Italy Election, Anti-E.U. Views Pay Off for Far Right and Populists." March 4, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁴⁷Donatienne Ruy. "Italian Election Results." March 7, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: Center for International and Strategic Studies).

⁴⁸"Italian Elections 2018 - Full Results." March 5, 2018. *The Guardian*.

formed a coalition government.⁴⁹

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The Italian economy prior to the election was sluggish, with youth unemployment at 32.7%.⁵⁰ Italian politics has also registered a growing backlash against immigration.⁵¹ Voter turnout continued its steady decline with 73% of eligible voters casting ballots.⁵²

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of parliamentary elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign. An analysis in the Spanish newspaper *El Pais* found that Russian misleading anti-immigration stories from Sputnik Italia⁵³ were spread widely by far right activists in Italy.⁵⁴ However, Euroskeptic and pro-Russian parties were already popular in Italy.⁵⁵

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by any of the anti-establishment, far right, Euroskeptic parties.⁵⁶

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.⁵⁷

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.⁵⁸

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.⁵⁹

⁴⁹Jason Horowitz. “[Italy’s Populist Parties Win Approval to Form Government.](#)” May 31, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁵⁰Donatienne Ruy. “[Italian Election Results.](#)” March 7, 2018. Center for International and Strategic Studies. Washington, D.C.

⁵¹Jason Horowitz. “[Immigration Moves Front and Center in Italy’s Local Elections.](#)” June 24, 2017. *New York Times*; Jason Horowitz. “[Why Italy’s Insular Election is More Important Than it Looks.](#)” March 2, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁵²Donatienne Ruy. “[Italian Election Results.](#)” March 7, 2018. Center for International and Strategic Studies. Washington, D.C.

⁵³*Sputnik Italia* is the Italian language service of the Russian state-run news website.

⁵⁴David Alandete. “[How Russian Networks Worked to Boost the Far Right in Italy.](#)” March 1, 2018. *El Pais*.

⁵⁵Jason Horowitz. “[Will Russia Meddle in Italy’s Election? It may not have to.](#)” March 1, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁵⁶Even the center-right coalition led by former PM Berlusconi favors closer ties with Russia and a lifting of sanctions. Jason Horowitz. “[Will Russia Meddle in Italy’s Election? It may not have to.](#)” March 1, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁵⁷The Five Star party maintains Euro-skeptic platform and support lifting sanctions on Russia. Jason Horowitz. “[In Italy Election, Anti-E.U. Views Pay Off for Far Right and Populists.](#)” March 4, 2018. *New York Times*; Jason Horowitz. “[Italy’s Populist Parties Win Approval to Form Government.](#)” May 31, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁵⁸The two major far right parties, M5S and the Northern League, campaigned on platforms that aligned with Russia disinformation efforts and were already popular.

⁵⁹Disinformation was already a major feature of the Italian information landscape. See Jason Horowitz. “[In Italian Schools, Reading, Writing and Recognizing Fake News.](#)” October 18, 2017. *New York Times*; Alberto Nardelli and Craig Silverman. “[One of The Biggest Alternative Media Networks in Italy is Spreading Anti-Immigrant News And Misinformation On Facebook.](#)” November 21, 2017. *BuzzFeed News*; Jason Horowitz. “[Italy, Bracing for Electoral Season of Fake News, Demands Facebook’s Help.](#)” November 24, 2017. *New York Times*; Yasmeen Serhan. “[Italy Scrambles to Fight Misinformation Ahead of its Elections.](#)” February 24, 2018. *The Atlantic*; Jason Horowitz. “[Why Italy’s Insular Election is More Important Than it Looks.](#)” March 2, 2018. *New York Times*; Paul Harrison. “[Italy’s Vote: Fake Claims Attempt to Influence Election.](#)” March 3, 2018. *BBC News*. Moreover, the anti-establishment parties were already quite popular. M5S won the single largest vote share in the 2013 elections. Tony Barber, Guy Dinmore, Michael MacKenzie, and

Czech Republic

DATE: January 12-13, 26-27 (runoff), 2018.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.

RESULTS: Incumbent president Milos Zeman won re-election with 51.4% of the vote (compared to 48.6% for Jiri Drahos). Turnout was over 66%.⁶⁰

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Incumbent president Zeman faced pro-Western candidate Jiri Drahos.⁶¹

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of the presidential elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign. Analysts noted a “pernicious social media campaign against Mr. Drahos that accused him, with no evidence, of being a collaborator of the secret police during Communist rule” as evidence of Russian interference.⁶²

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Elect Euroskeptic, pro-Russia Zeman.⁶³

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.⁶⁴

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.⁶⁵

2017

Czech Republic

DATE: October 20-21, 2017.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

RESULTS: Incumbent loss.

Dan McCrum. [“Final Vote Results Confirm Italy Deadlock.”](#) February 26, 2013. *Financial Times*.

⁶⁰Marc Santora. [“Czech Republic Re-elects Milos Zeman, Populist Leader and Foe of Migrants.”](#) January 27, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁶¹Robert Tait. [“Czech Presidential Election on a Knife-edge as Challenger Cries Foul.”](#) January 25, 2018. *The Guardian*.

⁶²Marc Santora. [“Czech Republic Re-elects Milos Zeman, Populist Leader and Foe of Migrants.”](#) January 27, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁶³While Zeman has publicly stated a commitment to NATO, he said during his victory speech he would support a referendum on Czech membership. Marc Santora. [“Czech Republic Re-elects Milos Zeman, Populist Leader and Foe of Migrants.”](#) January 27, 2018. *New York Times*; Hana de Goeij. [“Czech Leader’s Call to ‘Liquidate’ Journalists Was a Joke, His Office Says.”](#) May 15, 2017. *New York Times*.

⁶⁴Zeman, the incumbent president, was already pro-Russia.

⁶⁵Czech society also faced deep divisions on issues of European integration and migration, and Zeman’s calls to seal off the country from migrants and anti-Muslim rhetoric have been popular. Marc Santora. [“Czech Republic Re-elects Milos Zeman, Populist Leader and Foe of Migrants.”](#) January 27, 2018. *New York Times*.

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The populist ANO party led by Andrej Babis won 78 seats with 29.8% of the vote, an increase of 31 seats from 2013. The ruling Social Democratic Party (CSSD) lost 35 seats and only achieved 7.3% of the vote.⁶⁶ After months of negotiations, in June 2018 ANO and the CSSD agreed to a coalition government with the communist party.⁶⁷

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of parliamentary elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign and cyberattacks. Ahead of the elections, the Czech government established an anti-fake news unit “amid polling evidence that online disinformation is influencing public opinion and threatening to destabilize the country’s democratic system.”⁶⁸ The Czech foreign ministry was also the victim of hacking and breaching of email accounts.⁶⁹ The website used to present election results was hacked, but the Czech Statistical Office stated that “the vote count was not affected.”⁷⁰

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by the Euroskeptic ANO party.⁷¹

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.⁷²

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.⁷³

Spain

DATE: October 1, 2017.

ELECTION TYPE: Catalonia Independence Referendum (unsanctioned).

RESULTS: 90% of voters supported secession with turnout at only 42%, though the Madrid government and Spain’s highest court did not recognize the legitimacy of the referendum.⁷⁴

⁶⁶“Czech Election: Billionaire Babis wins by Large Margin.” October 22, 2017. *BBC News*.

⁶⁷Robert Muller and Jan Lopatka. “New Czech Government has Shaky Support, Strong Anti-Migration Stance.” June 27, 2018. *Reuters*.

⁶⁸“Czech Republic to Fight ‘Fake News’ with Specialist Unit.” December 28, 2016. *The Guardian*.

⁶⁹Robert Muller. “Foreign State seen behind Hack into Czech Foreign Ministry Email.” January 31, 2017. *Washington Post*.

⁷⁰Robert Muller. “Czech Election Websites Hacked, Vote Unaffected: Statistics Office.” October 22, 2017. *Reuters*.

⁷¹Peter Laca and Ladka Mortkowitz Bauerova. “Czechs Add to EU’s Headache by Electing Euroskeptic Billionaire.” October 22, 2017. *Bloomberg*.

⁷²The Euroskeptic ANO party had the second largest seat share in parliament since 2013, and the far right SPD party was already popular as well.

⁷³Euroskeptic parties already had growing popularity which coincided with a decline in support for mainstream pro-Europe parties. Several Euroskeptic parties did well in the 2017 elections, including a strong performance by the far right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party, as well as the Euroskeptic populist ANO party. Robert Muller and Jan Lopatka. “Far-Right Scores Surprise Success in Czech Election.” October 21, 2017. *Reuters*. The ruling centrist CSSD party performed relatively poorly in 2013 elections, barely beating the populist ANO party which gained 18.6% of the vote to the CSSD’s 22%. The predecessor to the SPD gained 6.8% of the vote. Tim Haugton, Tereza Novotna and Kevin Deegan-Krause. “The Czech Paradox: Did the Winner Lose and the Losers Win?.” October 30, 2013. *Washington Post* (Monkey Cage).

⁷⁴Angela Dewan, Vasco Cotovio, and Hilary Clarke. “Catalonia Independence Referendum: What Just Happened?” October 2, 2017. *CNN*.

On October 27, the regional government declared independence and Madrid imposed direct rule.⁷⁵

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The referendum was unsanctioned and deemed unconstitutional by Spain's highest court.⁷⁶

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of the unsanctioned independence referendum, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign. Spanish media reported that Russia interfered in the referendum with both disinformation and social media bots, as well as the spread of misleading images on Sputnik and RT.⁷⁷

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: To weaken the pro-EU Spanish government of Rajoy.⁷⁸

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Partial.⁷⁹

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.⁸⁰

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.⁸¹

Germany

DATE: September 24, 2017.

ELECTION TYPE: Federal.

RESULTS: Merkel's center-right CDU/CSU won 33% of the vote and Merkel became chancellor for a fourth term. The far right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 13.5% of the vote,

⁷⁵"Catalans Declare Independence as Madrid Imposes Direct Rule." October 27, 2017. *BBC News*; "Catalonia: Did Voters Face Worst Police Violence Ever Seen in the EU?" October 27, 2017. *BBC News*; Joseph Wilson. "Does Catalan Crisis Threaten to Make Spain 'Ungovernable'?" February 16, 2019. *AP News*.

⁷⁶Angela Dewan, Vasco Cotovio, and Hilary Clarke. "Catalonia Independence Referendum: What Just Happened?" October 2, 2017. *CNN*.

⁷⁷Digital Forensic Research Lab. "#Election Watch: Russia and Referendums in Catalonia?" September 28, 2017; Mark Scott and Diego Torres. "Catalan Referendum Stokes Fears of Russian Influence." September 29, 2017. *Politico*; Pilar Bonet. "Russia Use Catalan Referendum in Fight Against Brussels" October 1, 2017. *El Pais*; Vasco Cotovio and Emanuella Grinberg. "Spain: 'Misinformation' on Catalonia Referendum Came from Russia." November 13, 2017. *CNN*; Javier Lesaca. "Why Did Russian Social Media Swarm the Digital Conversation about Catalan Independence?" November 22, 2017. *Washington Post* (Monkey Cage); Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 135.

⁷⁸Pilar Bonet. "Russia Use Catalan Referendum in Fight Against Brussels" October 1, 2017. *El Pais*; "Russia Accused of Meddling in Catalonia Independence Vote with Fake News." October 1, 2017. *Haaretz*.

⁷⁹While the referendum was not accepted by the central government, the crisis has carried on. Joseph Wilson. "Does Catalan Crisis Threaten to Make Spain 'Ungovernable'?" February 16, 2019. *AP News*.

⁸⁰Catalan lawmakers supported secession.

⁸¹Disinformation featured prominently in the lead up to the referendum, but attributing much of it to the Russians is difficult. Amanda Erickson. "How Fake News Helped Shape the Catalonia Independence Vote." October 19, 2017. *Washington Post*; Ellis Palmer. "Spain Catalonia: Did Russian 'Fake News' Stir Things Up?" November 18, 2017. *BBC News*. Pro-independence parties were already popular in Catalonia. Diego Torres. "7 Contenders in the Catalan Election." December 5, 2017. *Politico*.

entering the Bundestag.⁸²

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The 2017 elections pitted the ruling Christian Democrat-led coalition against far right and leftist opposition, including the Euroskeptic anti-migrant Alternative for Germany (AfD).

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of Germany's federal elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign in addition to past funding for the far right AfD party. Germany's domestic intelligence agency accused Russia of cyberattacks and cyberespionage.⁸³ Russian media has also spread false and misleading news stories about refugee crimes.⁸⁴ The Kremlin is linked to three key German "propaganda outlets" which have been operating in Germany since 2013.⁸⁵ Russia has cultivated close ties to the AfD though the party rejects allegations it receives funding from Moscow.⁸⁶ Members of the AfD have admitted that Russian media helps increase the reach of their messaging, particularly among the Russian emigrant community.⁸⁷ However, materials hacked from the Bundestag in 2015 by Russians did not surface in the elections, and no widespread disinformation campaigns were apparent.⁸⁸

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory or strong performance by far right Euroskeptic Alternative for Germany (AfD).⁸⁹

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Partial.⁹⁰

⁸²Jon Henley. "German Elections 2017: Angela Merkel wins Fourth Term but AfD Makes Gains." September 24, 2017. *The Guardian*; Guy Chazan. "Merkel Elected to Fourth Term as German Chancellor." March 14, 2018. *Financial Times*.

⁸³Ann M. Simmons. "Russia's Meddling in Other Nation's Elections is Nothing New: Just Ask the Europeans." March 30, 2017. *Los Angeles Times*; Lizzie Dearden. "German Spy Chief Warns Russia Cyber Attacks Aiming to Influence Elections." May 4, 2017. *Independent*.

⁸⁴Jim Rutenberg. "RT, Sputnik and Russia's New Theory of War." September 13, 2017. *New York Times Magazine*.

⁸⁵Constance Stelzenmuller testimony to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "The Impact of Russian Interference on Germany's 2017 Elections." June 28, 2017.

⁸⁶Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 128.

⁸⁷Russian-speaking voters may make up one third of AfD supporters. Simon Shuster. "How Russian Voters Fueled the Rise of Germany's Far Right." September 25, 2017. *TIME*.

⁸⁸Griff Witte. "As Germans Prepare to Vote, a Mystery Grows: Where are the Russians?" September 10, 2017. *Washington Post*; Andrea Shalal and Eric Auchard. "German Election Campaign Largely Unaffected by Fake News or Bots." September 22, 2017. *Reuters*; Erik Brattberg and Tim Maurer. 2018. "Russian Election Interference: Europe's Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks." May 23. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

⁸⁹Griff Witte. "As Germans Prepare to Vote, a Mystery Grows: Where are the Russians?" September 10, 2017. *Washington Post*; Michelle Martin. "German Spy Agency Probes Russia Links to Right-Wing Parties - Report." February 14, 2019. *Reuters*.

⁹⁰While the center-right coalition led by Merkel was still able to form a government, it was considerably weakened and the AfD entered the Bundestag. Michelle Martin. "Far-Right Party Likened to Nazis to Shake Up German Parliament." September 17, 2017. *Reuters*; "Unwanted Colleagues: Other Parties Mull Best Way to Deal with AfD." September 26, 2017. *Der Spiegel*; Melissa Eddy. "Far Right Upsets Tradition of Consensus in New German Parliament." October 24, 2017. *New York Times*; Madeleine Schwartz. "Germany: With Centrists Like These..." March 30, 2018. *New York Review of Books*.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? No.⁹¹
 EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.⁹²

Malta

DATE: June 3, 2017.

ELECTION TYPE: General.

RESULTS: Victory by incumbent Joseph Muscat and the Labour Party with 55% of the vote and 92% turnout.⁹³

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Muscat and the Labour Party faced the nationalist Forza Nazjonalni party led by Simon Busuttil.⁹⁴

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of general elections, Russia engaged in cyberattacks. The Maltese government intelligence services asserted Russia was behind a series of cyberattacks, including DDoS, malware, and phishing attacks.⁹⁵ An external risk assessment identified Fancy Bear⁹⁶ as behind the attacks.⁹⁷

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Undermine the pro-EU Labour Party.⁹⁸

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? No.⁹⁹

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹⁰⁰

⁹¹Major parties supported the European Union. The Euroskeptic, far right AfD failed to enter the Bundestag in 2013 and the anti-NATO leftist Die Linke had a small seat share. “[Unwanted Colleagues: Other Parties Mull Best Way to Deal with AfD](#).” September 26, 2017. *Der Spiegel*

⁹²While disinformation and “junk news” shared by bots was widespread before the elections, Russian-sourced tweets appeared to be relatively rare. Lisa-Maria Neudert, Bence Kollanyi, and Philip N. Howard. 2017. “[Junk News and Bots during the German Parliamentary Election: What are German Voters Sharing over Twitter?](#)” COMPROP Data Memo 2017.7. September 19 (Oxford, U.K.: Computational Propaganda Project, Oxford University): 4-5.

⁹³“[Malta’s Muscat Wins Snap General Election](#).” June 4, 2017. *RFE/RL*; Chris Scicluna. “[Maltese PM Muscat Wins Second Term in Snap Election](#).” June 4, 2017. *Reuters*.

⁹⁴“[Malta’s Muscat Wins Snap General Election](#).” June 4, 2017. *RFE/RL*.

⁹⁵“[Muscat Raises Spectre of Russian Election Meddling, Busuttil Says Claims ‘Ridiculous’](#).” May 24, 2017. *Times of Malta*; Jamie Doward. “[Malta Accuses Russia of Cyber-Attacks in Run-Up to Election](#).” May 27, 2017. *The Guardian*.

⁹⁶Fancy Bear is a cyberespionage group that has been linked to the Russian military intelligence agency, GRU. Rebecca R. Ruiz. “[Russian Hackers Release Stolen Emails in New Effort to Undermine Doping Investigations](#).” January 10, 2018. *New York Times*.

⁹⁷Jamie Doward. “[Malta Accuses Russia of Cyber-Attacks in Run-Up to Election](#).” May 27, 2017. *The Guardian*.

⁹⁸Before the election, relations between Malta and Russia had soured, and Malta refused to allow Russian warships refuel in Maltese ports and impounded a weapons shipment to Syria. Jamie Doward. “[Malta Accuses Russia of Cyber-Attacks in Run-Up to Election](#).” May 27, 2017. *The Guardian*.

⁹⁹Both major parties support the European Union and pro-Russia supporters are marginal.

¹⁰⁰Turnout was high and there is no reason to suspect cyberattacks affected the vote total and hackers did not release damaging information on the incumbent.

France

DATE: April 23 and May 7, 2017.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.

RESULTS: Victory by centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron and En Marche party with 66.1% of the vote in the second round, compared to 33.9% for Marine Le Pen and her far-right National Front (FN).¹⁰¹

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The election pitted the centrist pro-EU Macron against the far right Euroskeptic Marine Le Pen.¹⁰² While Le Pen lost, it was a historically strong performance for the FN.¹⁰³

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of France's presidential elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign in addition to past funding for the far right National Front. According to a cybersecurity firm, Russian operatives targeted the campaign of candidate Emmanuel Macron and "there is already evidence of Russia using fake news, social media trolls, and other tactics to disrupt the election in France and other European countries."¹⁰⁴ Similar to the leak of Clinton campaign emails by Wikileaks in the United States, the organization and far right activists helped circulate hacked emails from Macron and En Marche.¹⁰⁵ Facebook announced in April it had "taken action against fake accounts that were spreading misinformation about the French election."¹⁰⁶ Ties between the National Front and Russian government officials stretched back to around 2011-12¹⁰⁷ and the FN received a "critical loan" of \$11.7 million from a Russian bank in 2014.¹⁰⁸

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by the far right, pro-Russia and Euroskeptic Le Pen.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰¹Gregor Aisch, Matthew Bloch, K. K. Rebecca Lai, and Benoit Morenne. "How France Voted." May 7, 2017. *New York Times*.

¹⁰²Gregor Aisch, Matthew Bloch, K. K. Rebecca Lai, and Benoit Morenne. "How France Voted." May 7, 2017. *New York Times*.

¹⁰³Emily Schultheis. "Marine Le Pen's Real Victory." May 7, 2017. *The Atlantic*.

¹⁰⁴Morgan Chalfant. "Russian Interference Looms over European Elections." April 21, 2017. *The Hill*.

¹⁰⁵"French President Vows Response to Hacking of Candidate's E-Mails." May 6, 2017. *RFE/RL*; Tim Starks. "French Candidate Prevails Against Russian Cyberattacks." May 8, 2017. *Politico*; Andy Greenberg. "The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election 'Infrastructure.'" May 9, 2017. *Wired*; Erik Brattberg and Tim Maurer. 2018. "Russian Election Interference: Europe's Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks." May 23. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

¹⁰⁶Joseph Menn. "Exclusive: Russia Used Facebook to Try to Spy on Macron Campaign - Sources." July 27, 2017. *Reuters*.

¹⁰⁷Marlene Laurelle. 2015. "Dangers Liasons? Eurasianism, European Far Right, and Putin's Russia." in *Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship*, ed. Marlene Laurelle (Lanham, M.D.: Lexington Books).

¹⁰⁸Peter Baker and Steven Erlanger. "Russia Uses Money and Ideology to Fight Western Sanctions." June 7, 2015. *New York Times*; Ken Gude. "Russia's Fifth Column." March 15, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress).

¹⁰⁹"*Putin vstretilsya c Marin Le Pen v Kremle.*" March 24, 2017. *TASS*; "*Putin vstretilsya c Marin Le*

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹¹⁰

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹¹¹

Bulgaria

DATE: March 26, 2017.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

RESULTS: Pro-EU GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) party wins a plurality and ex-PM Boyko Borisov returned to office.¹¹²

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The ruling GERB party faced the pro-Russia Socialist Party of the incumbent president.¹¹³

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of parliamentary elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign. Analysts asserted that “upwards of 300 Bulgarian websites were dedicated to advancing pro-Russian propaganda.”¹¹⁴

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Defeat of pro-Europe GERB party.

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.¹¹⁵

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹¹⁶

Pen. March 24, 2017. *RIA Novosti*; Gabriel Gatehouse. “[Marine Le Pen: Who’s Funding France’s Far Right?](#)” April 3, 2017. *BBC News*.

¹¹⁰The FN, established in 1972 and winning the second most votes in the first round, campaigned on a platform of Euroskepticism and opposition to immigration.

¹¹¹Researchers found that “junk news” and Russian-sourced information was shared relatively widely during the French elections and bots were active. However, such sources did not make up an overwhelming proportion of Twitter activity and most shared content was from reputable professional news organizations. Philip N. Howard et al. 2017. “[Junk News and Bots during the French Presidential Election: What Are French Voters Sharing over Twitter?](#)” April 22, 2017. COMPROP Data Memo (Oxford, U.K.: The Computational Propaganda Project, Oxford University): 3-4. The major opposition to Macron, the National Front, campaigned on pledges to stop immigration and renegotiate the terms of France’s EU membership. Adam Nossiter. “[As French Election Nears, Le Pen Targets Voters Her Party Once Repelled.](#)” March 19, 2017. *New York Times*; Gregor Aisch, Matthew Bloch, K. K. Rebecca Lai, and Benoit Morenne. “[How France Voted.](#)” May 7, 2017. *New York Times* Le Pen won 21.3% of the vote compared with 24% for Macron in the first round. Emily Schultheis. “[What Went Right With the French Campaign Polls?](#)” May 13, 2017. *The Atlantic*.

¹¹²Angel Krasimirov. “[Center-Right Party Wins 32.6 Percent in Bulgarian Election, 90 Percent of Votes Counted.](#)” March 25, 2017. *Reuters*; “[Bulgaria Center-Right Prime Minister Boyko Borisov Set for Return to Power.](#)” March 27, 2017. *DW*.

¹¹³“[Bulgaria Center-Right Prime Minister Boyko Borisov Set for Return to Power.](#)” March 27, 2017. *DW*.

¹¹⁴Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. “[Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security.](#)” January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 91.

¹¹⁵“[Bulgaria Center-Right Prime Minister Boyko Borisov Set for Return to Power.](#)” March 27, 2017. *DW*. However, GERB is still more pro-Russia than other European parties as it opposes sanctions on Moscow

¹¹⁶Both major parties opposed sanctions on Russia, with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) more generally pro-Russia. In addition to GERB and BSP, Bulgarian parliament contained multiple pro-Russia, Euroskeptic

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹¹⁷

Netherlands

DATE: March 15, 2017.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

RESULTS: Incumbent victory (loss of seats).

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Prior to the election, the PVV and the VVD were expected to receive similar vote shares.¹¹⁸ However, the ruling People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) led by Prime Minister Mark Rutte won 21.3% of the vote and 33 seats (a loss of 8). The coalition partner, the Labor Party (PvdA) lost 29 seats, only securing 9 seats and 5.7% of the vote. The far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) led by Geert Wilders gained 5 seats (for a total of 20) with 13.1% of the vote.¹¹⁹ A coalition was formed by the VVD and three smaller parties (the CDA, the D66 and the CU).¹²⁰

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of parliamentary elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign as well as cyber attacks. Russia was accused by the Dutch intelligence agency (AIVD) of "spreading fake news."¹²¹ During the election, "some Dutch organizations and platforms were subject to distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including websites that helped voters compare the platforms of different political parties."¹²² Out of fear over Russian hacking of the electoral system and falsifying results, votes were counted manually.¹²³

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Aid the anti-EU, anti-NATO, far-right PVV party.¹²⁴

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA?: No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹²⁵

parties such as the Patriotic Front and the Attack Party. Reggie Kramer. "[Bulgaria's Presidential Election: Uncertainty Looms](#)." February 1, 2017 (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute).

¹¹⁷In addition to a general pro-Russia orientation of the major political parties, there is also domestically-generated pro-Russian disinformation. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "[Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security](#)." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 91.

¹¹⁸Stephanie van den Berg. "[Splintering of Dutch Politics Augurs Instability after Election](#)." March 6, 2017. *Reuters*.

¹¹⁹"[Dutch Election Results](#)." March 16, 2017. *The Economist*.

¹²⁰Cynthia Kroet. "[Dutch Government Coalition Deal Receives Parliamentary Backing](#)." October 10, 2017. *Politico*.

¹²¹Cynthia Kroet. "[Russia Spread Fake News During Dutch Election: Report](#)." April 4, 2017. *Politico*; Erik Brattberg and Tim Maurer. 2018. "[Russian Election Interference: Europe's Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks](#)." May 23. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

¹²²Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "[Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security](#)." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): p. 114.

¹²³Cynthia Kroet. "[Dutch Votes to be Counted Manually Over Hacking Fears](#)." February 1, 2017. *Politico*.

¹²⁴Ken Gude. "[Russia's 5th Column](#)." March 15, 2017. *Center for American Progress*.

¹²⁵The PVV, a far right Euroskeptic party was polling even with the pro-EU party and rose from the third to second largest party in parliament after the election. Stephanie van den Berg. "[Splintering of Dutch](#)

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low¹²⁶

2016

Italy

DATE: December 4, 2016.

ELECTION TYPE: Constitutional referendum.

RESULTS: The referendum was rejected and Prime Minister Renzi resigned.¹²⁷

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The referendum included a range of questions that would significantly alter the constitution and shape and size of the Italian government. The referendum was backed by pro-EU Prime Minister Matteo Renzi.¹²⁸

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of the constitutional referendum, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign and had existing ties to the far right. The main opposition to the referendum was led by the far right Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League. The leadership of the M5S met with senior United Russia officials, and the Northern League has longstanding ties to the Kremlin.¹²⁹ During the referendum, disinformation was widespread and alleged to have originated in Russia.¹³⁰ M5S has also spread disinformation produced by Russian media sources.¹³¹

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: A failure for Renzi.¹³²

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.¹³³

Politics Augurs Instability after Election.” March 6, 2017. *Reuters*; [“Dutch Election Results.”](#) March 16, 2017. *The Economist*

¹²⁶“The election appears to have occurred without any voting issues, and some observers noted that disinformation did not appear to play a large role during the campaign period, with fake news stories posted to Facebook and Twitter being quickly debunked by commentators.” Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. [“Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security.”](#) January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): p. 114.

¹²⁷Chris Hanretty. [“Italy Voted ‘No’ to Constitutional Reform. This is Why, and What Will Happen Next.”](#) December 5, 2016. *Washington Post* (Monkey Cage).

¹²⁸Elisabetta Povoledo. [“Italy’s Constitutional Referendum: What You Need to Know.”](#) December 2, 2016. *New York Times*.

¹²⁹Ken Gude. [“Russia’s Fifth Column.”](#) March 15, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress).

¹³⁰Jason Horowitz. [“Spread of Fake News Provokes Anxiety in Italy.”](#) December 2, 2016. *New York Times*.

¹³¹Alberto Nardelli and Craig Silverman. [“Italy’s Most Popular Political Party is Leading Europe in Fake News and Kremlin Propaganda.”](#) November 29, 2016. *BuzzFeed News*; Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. [“Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security.”](#) January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 137.

¹³²The referendum was widely “seen as a litmus test for the Renzi government.” Elisabetta Povoledo. [“Italy’s Constitutional Referendum: What You Need to Know.”](#) December 2, 2016. *New York Times*.

¹³³The outcome was seen as “a major victory” for the far right, Euroskeptic M5S. Stephanie Kirchgassner and Angela Giuffrida. [“Italian PM Matteo Renzi Resigns after Referendum Defeat.”](#) December 6, 2016. *The Guardian*.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹³⁴
EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹³⁵

United States

DATE: November 8, 2016.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential election.

RESULTS: Surprise victory by Donald J. Trump over Hillary R. Clinton.¹³⁶

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: In the run up to the presidential election, it was widely believed that former Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton would defeat Donald Trump.¹³⁷

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Leading up to the U.S. presidential elections, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign as well as cyberattacks and the leaking of hacked emails from the Clinton campaign. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election has been well-established and widely acknowledged.¹³⁸ On February 16, 2018, the Justice Department Special Counsel investigation led by Robert S. Mueller III indicted 13 Russian nationals for interfering in the U.S. election.¹³⁹ The focus of the [indictment](#) is on the Internet Research Agency, based in St. Petersburg. The indictment charges that Russian efforts began as early as 2014, though the indictment does not accuse the Russian government of involvement.¹⁴⁰ However, the financier of the IRA, Yevgeny Prigozhin, is a close Putin ally.¹⁴¹ The IRA produced misleading and false information aimed at polarizing the U.S. electorate¹⁴² and even orga-

¹³⁴The anti-establishment M5S party was the largest single party in Italian parliament at the time of the referendum and led the No campaign. Tony Barber, Guy Dinmore, Michael MacKenzie, and Dan McCrum. “[Final Vote Results Confirm Italy Deadlock](#).” February 26, 2013. *Financial Times*; Alberto Nardelli and Craig Silverman. “[Italy’s Most Popular Political Party is Leading Europe in Fake News and Kremlin Propaganda](#).” November 29, 2016. *BuzzFeed News*.

¹³⁵Domestic sources produced much of the disinformation. Alberto Nardelli and Craig Silverman. “[Italy’s Most Popular Political Party is Leading Europe in Fake News and Kremlin Propaganda](#).” November 29, 2016. *BuzzFeed News*.

¹³⁶Fred A. Wright and Alec A. Wright. 2018. “[How Surprising was Trump’s Victory? Evaluations of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election and a New Poll Aggregation Model](#).” *Electoral Studies* 54 (August): 81.

¹³⁷Karen Tumulty, Philip Rucker, and Anne Gearan. “[Donald Trump Wins the Presidency in Stunning Upset over Clinton](#).” November 9, 2016. *Washington Post*.

¹³⁸Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima, and Greg Miller. “[Secret CIA Assessment Says Russia was Trying to Help Trump Win White House](#).” December 9, 2016. *Washington Post*; Julie Hirschfield Davis and Maggie Haberman. “[Trump Concedes Russia’s Interference in Election](#).” January 11, 2017. *New York Times*.

¹³⁹Devlin Barrett, Sari Horwitz, and Rosalind S. Helderman. “[Russian Troll Farm, 13 Suspects Indicted in 2016 Election Interference](#).” February 16, 2018. *Washington Post*.

¹⁴⁰Devlin Barrett, Sari Horwitz, and Rosalind S. Helderman. “[Russian Troll Farm, 13 Suspects Indicted in 2016 Election Interference](#).” February 16, 2018. *Washington Post*.

¹⁴¹Neil MacFarquhar. “[Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., is Known as ‘Putin’s Cook’](#).” February 16, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹⁴²Scott Shane. “[Purged Facebook Page Tied to the Kremlin Spread Anti-Immigrant Bile](#).” September 12, 2017. *New York Times*; Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti. “[The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far](#).” September 20, 2018. *New York Times*.

nized protests in the U.S. attended by unwitting Americans.¹⁴³ On July 13 2018, the Justice Department indicted twelve Russian intelligence officers from the Russian military foreign intelligence service, GRU.¹⁴⁴ In this [indictment](#), the Justice Department alleges that this GRU operation involved “the staged releases of documents stolen through computer intrusions. These [GRU] units conducted large-scale cyber operations to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.” The January 2017 ODNI report states that Russian intelligence services had access to Democratic National Committee networks from July 2015 until at least June 2016.¹⁴⁵ Russia passed along emails it obtained through hacking to Wikileaks, who released the documents.¹⁴⁶ Russian intelligence also gained access to multiple state and local electoral boards.¹⁴⁷ Russian state media such as RT and Sputnik spread disinformation in English targeted at the American electorate.¹⁴⁸

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by Donald Trump.¹⁴⁹

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹⁵⁰

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Moderate.¹⁵¹

¹⁴³Ali Breland. “[Thousands Attended Protest Organized by Russians on Facebook](#).” October 31, 2017. *The Hill*; Alicia Parlapiano and Jasmine C. Lee. “[The Propaganda Tools Used by Russians to Influence the 2016 Election](#).” February 16, 2018. *New York Times*; Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti. “[The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far](#).” September 20, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹⁴⁴Devlin Barnett and Matt Zapotosky. “[Mueller Probe Indicts 12 Russians with Hacking of Democrats in 2016](#).” July 13, 2018. *Washington Post*. While its official name is the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (*Glavnoye upravleniye General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhyonnikh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, or GU), it is usually referred to by its previous abbreviation, GRU (*Glavnoye rasvedivatel’noye upravleniye*). GRU takes on missions similar to Russia’s other foreign intelligence service and the formal successor to foreign intelligence work of the the KGB, the SVR (*Sluzhba vshesney razvedki*). “[What is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?](#)” September 5, 2018. *Reuters*. “[What is the GRU?](#)” November 6, 2018. *Meduza*.

¹⁴⁵“[Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections](#).” Intelligence Community Assessment. January 6, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence): 2.

¹⁴⁶Raffi Khatchadourian. “[What the Latest Mueller Indictment Reveals About Wikileaks’ Ties to Russia - And What it Doesn’t](#).” July 24, 2018. *New Yorker*.

¹⁴⁷“[Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections](#).” Intelligence Community Assessment. January 6, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence): 3; Nicole Perlroth, Michael Wines, and Matthew Rosenberg. “[Russian Election Hacking Efforts, Wider Than Previously Known, Draw Little Scrutiny](#).” September 1, 2017. *New York Times*.

¹⁴⁸“[Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections](#).” Intelligence Community Assessment. January 6, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence): 3-4.

¹⁴⁹“[Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections](#).” Intelligence Community Assessment. January 6, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence): ii, 1-2.

¹⁵⁰The Russian disinformation campaign was aimed at bolstering the messaging of the Republican Party.

¹⁵¹Given the extremely close and largely unexpected result, the widespread nature of the intervention, and the potential role played by Russian disinformation in depressing voter turnout by key Democratic constituencies, it is difficult to rule out a role played by Russian intervention. While disinformation was widespread in the U.S. election, it appears that Russian-sourced information made up a relatively small proportion of the total. Brendan Nyhan and Yusaku Horiuchi. “[Homegrown ‘Fake News’ is a Bigger Problem than Russian Propaganda. Here’s a Way to Make Falsehoods More Costly for Politicians](#).” October 23, 2017. *Washington Post* (Monkey Cage). Moreover, the IRA disseminated American-produced news stories. Leon Yim et al. 2018. “[Your Friendly Neighborhood Troll: The Internet Research Agency’s Use of Local and Fake News in the 2016 US Presidential Campaign](#).” SMaPP Data Report 2018:01 (New York: Social Media and

Bulgaria

DATE: November 6, November 13 (second round) 2016.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.

RESULTS: Pro-Russia Socialist Party candidate Rumen Radev defeated Tsetska Tsacheva of the ruling GERB party with around 60% of the vote.¹⁵² The defeat of Tsacheva prompted Prime Minister Boyko Borisov to resign until parliamentary elections in March 2017 which saw GERB win a plurality.¹⁵³

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The ruling pro-EU GERB party faced the more pro-Russia Socialist Party.¹⁵⁴

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Before the presidential elections, Russia gave strategic assistance to the opposition party. In the run-up to the election, the opposition Socialist Party received a “secret strategy document” outlining recommendations for how to plant fake news and promote misleading polling data and emphasize issues that “dovetailed with Kremlin policy.” Bulgarian security officials allege the dossier was created by Kremlin-connected think tank and delivered by a former Russian spy on the U.S. sanctions list.¹⁵⁵

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by the more pro-Russia Radev over pro-EU GERB party candidate.¹⁵⁶

Political Participation Lab, New York University): 4-6. However, Russian disinformation reached some 126 million Americans on Facebook, some 20 million on Instagram, and 1.4 million on Twitter. Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti. “[The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far](#).” September 20, 2018. *New York Times*. From 2013-2018, IRA Facebook posts were shared by 30 million users and Instagram posts received nearly 185 million likes. Philip N. Howard, Bharath Ganesh, and Dimitra Liotsiou. “[The IRA, Social Media, and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012-2018](#).” Computational Propaganda Research Report. December 17, 2018 (Oxford, U.K.: Computational Propaganda Project, Oxford University): 3, 6-7. Another study also using data from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found around 77 million engagements with IRA content on Facebook, 187 million on Instagram, and 73 million on Twitter. Renee DiResta et al. “[The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency](#).” December 17, 2018 (Austin, T.X.: NewKnowledge): 7. Yet others have found that sharing fake news by Americans is relatively rare. Andrew Guess, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua Tucker. 2019. “[Less Than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination on Facebook](#).” *Science Advances* 5: 1.

¹⁵²Tsvetelia Tsoleva and Angel Krasimirov. “[Russia-Friendly Political Novice Wins Bulgaria Presidential Election: Exit Polls](#).” November 12, 2016. *Reuters*; “[Bulgaria Faces Uncertainty After Election of Pro-Russia President](#).” November 14, 2016. *RFE/RL*.

¹⁵³Angel Krasimirov. “[Center-Right Party Wins 32.6 Percent in Bulgarian Election, 90 Percent of Votes Counted](#).” March 25, 2017. *Reuters*.

¹⁵⁴Tsvetelia Tsoleva and Angel Krasimirov. “[Russia-Friendly Political Novice Wins Bulgaria Presidential Election: Exit Polls](#).” November 12, 2016. *Reuters*.

¹⁵⁵Joe Parkinson and Georgi Kantchev. “[Document: Russia Uses Rigged Polls, Fake News to Sway Foreign Elections](#).” March 23, 2017. *Wall Street Journal*; Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. “[Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security](#).” January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 91.

¹⁵⁶While Radev does not advocate leaving NATO or the EU, he supports lifting sanctions against Russia. Tsvetelia Tsoleva and Angel Krasimirov. “[Russia-Friendly Political Novice Wins Bulgaria Presidential](#)

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.¹⁵⁷

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹⁵⁸

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹⁵⁹

Montenegro

DATE: October 16, 2016.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary elections.

RESULTS: Incumbent Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) won a plurality with 41% of the vote. However, Djukanovic stepped down after the election and his Deputy PM Dusko Markovic took over.¹⁶⁰

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Incumbent Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and his Democratic Party of Socialists was running on a platform to join NATO.¹⁶¹

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: In the lead up to the election, Russian state entities provided funds to opposition parties, spread disinformation on social media about widespread voter fraud and launched cyberattacks against government and news websites.¹⁶² Two Russians

Election: Exit Polls." November 12, 2016. *Reuters*.

¹⁵⁷Though with the victory of GERB in parliamentary elections the following spring, the developments "appeared to be a disappointment for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia." Boryana Dzhambazova. "Bulgaria's Ex-Premier Nears Return to Power in a Key Election for Europe." March 26, 2017. *New York Times*. Moreover, Radev has expressed strong support for the EU and NATO since assuming the presidency. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 91.

¹⁵⁸Both major parties opposed sanctions on Russia, with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) more generally pro-Russia. In addition to GERB and BSP, Bulgarian parliament contained multiple pro-Russia, Euroskeptic parties such as the Patriotic Front and the Attack Party. Reggie Kramer. "Bulgaria's Presidential Election: Uncertainty Looms." February 1, 2017 (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute).

¹⁵⁹The GERB party faced a series of domestic political difficulties, including a corruption scandal and a lagging economy, as well as anti-migrant sentiment. Boryana Dzhambazova, Kit Gillet, and Rick Lyman. "Pro-Russia Candidate Appears Likely to Win Bulgarian Presidency." November 13, 2016. *New York Times*. The Bulgarian Socialist Party is somewhat pro-Russia, and though Radev publicly supported NATO and EU, he also expressed an interest in close ties with Russia. Both candidates opposed sanctions on Russia. The BSP was the second largest party in the National Assembly, and nationalist Euroskeptic groups are also popular (such as the Patriot Front and Ataka). Reggie Kramer. "Bulgaria's Presidential Election: Uncertainty Looms." February 1, 2017 (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute).

¹⁶⁰Aleksandar Vasovic. "Muddy Vote Result Weakens Djukanovic's 25-year Grip on Montenegro." October 15, 2016. *Reuters*; Aleksandar Vasovic. "Montenegro Opposition Rejects Election Outcome Due to 'Atmosphere of Fear.'" October 18, 2016. *Reuters*; Julian Borger. "Montenegro's PM Quits After Suggesting Russia had Role in Election Plot." October 25, 2016. *The Guardian*; Andrew Macdowall. "Montenegro's Prime Minister Resigns, Perhaps Bolstering Country's E.U. Hopes." October 26, 2016. *New York Times*; Petar Komnenic. "Montenegro Says Foiled Russian-Backed Plan to Kill PM Djukanovic." November 6, 2016. *Reuters*.

¹⁶¹David Shimer. "Smaller Democracies Grapple with the Threat of Russian Interference." December 8, 2018. *New Yorker*.

¹⁶²Saim Saeed. "US Intelligence Chief: Russia Interfering in French, German Elections." March 30, 2017. *Politico*; David Shimer. "Smaller Democracies Grapple with the Threat of Russian Interference." December

also initiated an ultimately failed plot to kill Djukanovic and install a new government hostile to NATO in a coup d'état.¹⁶³ The U.K. government confirmed a Russian role in the plot¹⁶⁴ and in April 2017, the U.S. government announced it had credible evidence Russia had attempted to interfere in the 2016 Montenegrin elections.¹⁶⁵ A Montenegrin High Court is currently trying fourteen suspects in connection to the attempted coup, including two GRU-connected Russians in absentia.¹⁶⁶

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Prevent Montenegro from joining NATO and electing pro-Moscow candidates.¹⁶⁷

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹⁶⁸

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.¹⁶⁹

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹⁷⁰

8, 2018. *New Yorker*.

¹⁶³Andrew Higgins. "Finger Pointed at Russians in Alleged Coup Plot in Montenegro." November 26, 2016. *New York Times*; Reuf Bajrovic, Vesko Garcevic, and Richard Kraemer. 2018. *Hanging by a Thread: Russia's Strategy of Destabilization in Montenegro* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute): 9-10; Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office: 77.

¹⁶⁴"Report: U.K. Officials See Russia Behind October Montenegro Plot." February 19, 2017. *RFE/RL*.

¹⁶⁵Steve Holland. "U.S. says 'Credible Reports' Russia Tried to Interfere with Montenegro Elections." April 12, 2017. *Reuters*.

¹⁶⁶David Shimer. "Smaller Democracies Grapple with the Threat of Russian Interference." December 8, 2018. *New Yorker*.

¹⁶⁷Steven Erlanger. "NATO Unveils Plans to Grow, Drawing Fury and Threats from Russia." December 2, 2015. *New York Times*; Andrew Higgins. "Finger Pointed at Russians in Alleged Coup Plot in Montenegro." November 26, 2016. *New York Times*.

¹⁶⁸The largest opposition bloc, the Democratic Front, was pro-Russia and opposed to joining NATO. Dusica Tomovic. "Anti-NATO Groups Demand Referendum in Montenegro." February 10, 2017. *Balkan Insight*; Ivana Sekularac. "End of the Affair: Montenegro Jilts Russia by Joining NATO." May 22, 2017. *Reuters*; "NATO Anniversary Highlights Divisions in Montenegro." June 5, 2018. *Balkan Insight*.

¹⁶⁹In 2017, Montenegro joined NATO. While Djukanovic stepped down under unclear circumstances after the election, his party maintained power and he was succeeded by fellow Democratic Party of Socialist member Dusko Markovic. Djukanovic assumed the presidency after winning the 2018 elections. Julian Borger. "Montenegro's PM Quits After Suggesting Russia had Role in Election Plot.." October 25, 2016. *The Guardian*; While the measure passed 46-0, pro-Russia opposition MPs boycotted the vote. "Montenegro Ratifies NATO Membership in Historic Shift to Western Alliance." April 28, 2017. *The Guardian*; Zachary Cohen. "Montenegro Officially joins NATO." June 5, 2017. *CNN*; Djukanovic also returned to the premiership in 2018. Aleksandar Vasovic. "Veteran Djukanovic wins Montenegro Presidential Election." April 16, 2018. *Reuters*. Public opinion is largely split between pro- and anti-NATO sentiment. "NATO Anniversary Highlights Divisions in Montenegro." June 5, 2018. *Balkan Insight*.

¹⁷⁰The DPS party won elections and NATO accession despite split public opinion and the presence of pro-Russia opposition parties organized in the Democratic Front. Dusica Tomovic. "Anti-NATO Groups Demand Referendum in Montenegro." February 10, 2017. *Balkan Insight*; Ivana Sekularac. "End of the Affair: Montenegro Jilts Russia by Joining NATO." May 22, 2017. *Reuters*; "NATO Anniversary Highlights Divisions in Montenegro." June 5, 2018. *Balkan Insight*.

United Kingdom

DATE: June 23, 2016.

ELECTION TYPE: Referendum on EU membership ('Brexit').

RESULTS: In a surprise decision, voters chose to leave the EU 53.4% to 46.6%, prompting Prime Minister David Cameron to resign.¹⁷¹

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: All of the major parties in parliament were in favor of remaining in the EU.¹⁷²

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of the EU membership referendum, Russia engaged in a disinformation campaign. Researches noted that some 150,000 Russian-language twitter accounts were posting "tens of thousands of messages in English urging Britain to leave the European Union."¹⁷³ Bots circulated "false or inflammatory stories" and were linked to the Internet Research Agency.¹⁷⁴ Facebook announced in early 2018 it was broadening an internal investigation into the role of Russian disinformation leading up to Brexit.¹⁷⁵ RT and Sputnik "pushed hard for Brexit."¹⁷⁶

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: For Britain to leave the EU.¹⁷⁷

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? No.¹⁷⁸

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷¹Steven Erlanger. "Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down." June 23, 2016. *New York Times*; George Parker and Michael Mackenzie. "Britain Turns its Back on Europe." June 24, 2016. *Financial Times*; Griff Witte, Karla Adam, and Dan Balz. "In Stunning Decision, Britain Votes to Leave the E.U." June 24, 2016. *Washington Post*.

¹⁷²Sara B. Hobolt. 2016. "The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(9): 1261.

¹⁷³David D. Kirkpatrick. "Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum." November 15, 2017. *New York Times*.

¹⁷⁴Donie O'Sullivan. "Russian Trolls Pushed Pro-Brexit Spin on Day of Referendum." November 10, 2017. *CNN*; Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): p 116, 118.

¹⁷⁵David D. Kirkpatrick. "Facebook to Take Broader Look at Possible Russian Role in Brexit Vote." January 17, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹⁷⁶David D. Kirkpatrick. "Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum." November 15, 2017. *New York Times*.

¹⁷⁷Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): p 116. The main financier of the Leave campaign, Arron Banks, may have close ties with the Russian government. David D. Kirkpatrick and Matthew Rosenberg. "Russians Offered Business Deals to Brexit's Biggest Backer." June 29, 2018. *New York Times*.

¹⁷⁸All of the major British parties supported remaining in the EU. While Euroskeptic UKIP had the third largest popular vote share in the last elections, it had a very small seat share. "General Election 2017: Where UK's Parties Stand on Brexit." June 1, 2017. *BBC News*.

¹⁷⁹An academic study found very little reach for Russian accounts posting about the referendum, though they did find wide dissemination of "junk news" not attributable to Russia. Vidya Narayanan et al. 2017. "Russian Involvement and Junk News during Brexit." COMPROP Data Memo 2017.10. December 19

Netherlands

DATE: April 6, 2016.

ELECTION TYPE: Referendum on EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.¹⁸⁰

RESULTS: The Agreement was rejected “overwhelmingly” by a 64-36 margin with only 32% turnout.¹⁸¹ However, as the referendum was non-binding, Dutch parliament backed the association agreement and it came into force on September 1, 2017.¹⁸²

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, a broad political, trade, and defense treaty had already been signed onto by the Dutch government and approved by all other EU nations was put up for a non-binding vote by the Dutch electorate.¹⁸³

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of the referendum, Sputnik and RT were used to spread a disinformation campaign and discredit the government of Ukraine.¹⁸⁴

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Rejection of the Association Agreement.

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Partial.¹⁸⁵

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.¹⁸⁶

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Medium.¹⁸⁷

(Oxford, U.K.: Computational Propaganda Project, Oxford University): 4.

¹⁸⁰Toby Sterling. “[Dutch Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Ukraine-EU Treaty.](#)” April 7, 2016. *Reuters*.

¹⁸¹Toby Sterling. “[Dutch Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Ukraine-EU Treaty.](#)” April 7, 2016. *Reuters*.

¹⁸²Cynthia Kroet. “[Dutch Lower House Backs EU-Ukraine Agreement.](#)” February 22, 2017. *Politico*; “[EU Formally Approves Ukraine Association Agreement.](#)” July 11, 2017. *RFE/RL*.

¹⁸³Toby Sterling. “[Dutch Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Ukraine-EU Treaty.](#)” April 7, 2016. *Reuters*.

¹⁸⁴Anne Applebaum. [Opinion: The Dutch Just Showed the World How Russia Influences Western European Elections.](#) April 8, 2016. *Washington Post*; Andrew Higgins. “[Fake News, Fake Ukrainians: How a Group of Russians Tilted a Dutch Vote.](#)” February 16, 2017. *New York Times*; Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. “[Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security.](#)” January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 113.

¹⁸⁵While the measure was nevertheless enacted, the failure of the referendum was a setback for the pro-Europe government. Cynthia Kroet. “[Dutch Lower House Backs EU-Ukraine Agreement.](#)” February 22, 2017. *Politico*; “[EU Formally Approves Ukraine Association Agreement.](#)” July 11, 2017. *RFE/RL*.

¹⁸⁶While the ruling PVV and PvdA both supported the agreement, the far right, Euroskeptic PVV (tied for third largest party in parliament) opposed the EU-Ukraine association agreement. Simon Otjes “[Could the Netherlands’ Referendum on Ukraine Really Create a ‘Continental Crisis’?](#)” January 26, 2016 (London: London School of Economics and Political Science); “[Dutch Election Results.](#)” March 16, 2017. *The Economist*. Moreover, anti-EU sentiment has been fairly widespread in the Netherlands, with Dutch voters overwhelmingly striking down a 2005 referendum on the EU constitution that took the political establishment by surprise (who nevertheless enacted the agreement). Interview of Pieter Cleppe. “[Dutch Elections and the Future of the EU.](#)” Interview by James McBride. March 10, 2017 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations).

¹⁸⁷Voters said “they were opposing not only the treaty but wider European policymaking on matters ranging from the migrant crisis to economics.” Toby Sterling. “[Dutch Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Ukraine-EU Treaty.](#)” April 7, 2016. *Reuters*. Simon Otjes “[Could the Netherlands’ Referendum on Ukraine Really Create a ‘Continental Crisis’?](#)” January 26, 2016 (London: London School of Economics and Political Science); Tim Boersma. “[The Dutch Rejection of an EU-Ukraine Deal isn’t about Ukraine.](#)” April 8, 2016. However, some

2015

United Kingdom

DATE: May 7, 2015.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

RESULTS: Victory by ruling Conservative Party.¹⁸⁸

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: While the election was predicted to be close, the Conservative Party instead won a clear majority.¹⁸⁹

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Ahead of the parliamentary elections, Russia engaged in cyberattacks. The head of the UK National Cyber Security Centre stated that “there is evidence of attempted cyber attacks in the run-up to the May 2015 British general elections.”¹⁹⁰ Former Labour minister Chris Bryant also confirmed evidence of Russian interference.¹⁹¹

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Strong performance by Euroskeptic UKIP party.

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? No.¹⁹²

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.¹⁹³

polls suggested that some of those who voted no cited a view of Ukraine as corrupt as an important motivator. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. “[Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security](#).” January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 114.

¹⁸⁸“[Election Results](#).” *BBC News*.

¹⁸⁹ Guy Faulconbridge and Kate Holton. “[Cameron Sweeps to Unexpected Triumph in British Election](#).” May 8, 2015. *Reuters*.

¹⁹⁰Kim Sengupta. “[Russia Accused of Launching Hacking Campaign during UK General Election](#).” February 14, 2017. *Independent*.

¹⁹¹Katie Forster. “[Clear Evidence Russia Interfered in 2015 UK Election, Says Former Labour Minister](#).” February 21, 2017. *Independent*.

¹⁹²Both of the major parties (Tories and Labour) as well as the Liberal Democrats were pro-EU. However, the Euroskeptic UKIP party (founded 1993) gained 12.6% of the vote (the third highest), an increase of 9.5% over 2010. However, they only gained one seat in parliament. “[2015 Election Results](#).” *BBC News*; “[General Election 2017: Where UK’s Parties Stand on Brexit](#).” June 1, 2017. *BBC News*.

¹⁹³Mainstream parties performed well and there is no reason to suspect cyberattacks affected the vote total and hackers did not release damaging information on the incumbent.

2014

Moldova

DATE: November 30, 2014.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

RESULTS: While the Socialist Party (PSRM) won a narrow plurality, the ruling pro-European coalition retained a narrow majority and formed a government.¹⁹⁴

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The pro-Russia socialist party favored membership in a Russian-led customs union and the ruling center-right coalition favored closer ties with the EU.¹⁹⁵

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia provided funding for a pro-Moscow party, and held high profile meetings with the head of the Socialist Party to demonstrate its support. The Moldovan Central Election Commission disqualified the pro-Moscow Patria party days before the legislative elections for illegal use of foreign funds and allegations that the head of the party admitted to being an FSB agent.¹⁹⁶ In early November, Russian President Putin held a high profile meeting with the head of the Socialist Party, Igor Dodon.¹⁹⁷

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by a pro-Russia party.

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

Ukraine

DATE: May 25, 2014.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.

RESULTS: Pro-Europe candidate Petro Poroshenko won with 54.7% of the vote.¹⁹⁸

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: This was the first election after the EuroMaidan protests toppled Yanukovich, a civil war broke out in eastern Ukraine, and Russian forces seized Crimea.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁴“Pro-EU Parties Ahead in Moldovan Elections.” November 30, 2014. *Reuters*.

¹⁹⁵“Pro-EU Parties Ahead in Moldovan Elections.” November 30, 2014. *Reuters*.

¹⁹⁶Valentina Ursu and Robert Coalson. “East or West? Divided Moldova’s Tense Election Season Comes Down to the Wire.” November 27, 2014. *RFE/RL*.

¹⁹⁷Valentina Ursu and Robert Coalson. “East or West? Divided Moldova’s Tense Election Season Comes Down to the Wire.” November 27, 2014. *RFE/RL*.

¹⁹⁸Shaun Walker and Alec Luhn. “Petro Poroshenko wins Ukraine Presidency, According to Exit Polls.” May 25, 2014. *The Guardian*.

¹⁹⁹Alison Smale. “Just Like His Power, Ukrainian Ex-Leader Vanishes Into Thin Air.” February 24, 2014. *New York Times*; Steven Lee Myers and Ellen Barry. “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West.” March 18, 2014. *New York Times*; Andrew E. Kramer. “Ukraine Sends Force to Stem Unrest in East.” April 15, 2014. *New York Times*; David M. Herszenhorn. “Fears Rise as Russian Military Units Pour into Ukraine.” November 12, 2014. *New York Times*.

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia “launched a series of coordinated cyber-attacks” including “attempts to fake vote totals.”²⁰⁰ Russian hackers also used malware to “infect the servers at Ukraine’s central election commission.”²⁰¹ Ahead of the elections, the Russian hacking group CyberBerkut “rigged the website of the country’s Central Election Commission to announced ultra-right presidential candidate Dmytro Yarosh as the winner.”²⁰²

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by a pro-Russia candidate or far right Ukrainian nationalists.²⁰³

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? No.²⁰⁴

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

2009

Moldova

DATE: April 5, 2009.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

RESULTS: Victory by Voronin and the ruling PCRM.²⁰⁵

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: While the PCRM won the April elections, they were unable to form a government and new elections were held in July which led to a PCRM plurality but a government formed by pro-Western parties.²⁰⁶

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia provided material support for Voronin and the PCRM and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held a high profile meeting with the Moldovan incumbent in March, promising to distribute oil to Moldovan farmers to boost incumbent popularity.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁰Jason Le Miere. “[Russia Election Hacking: Countries Where the Kremlin Has Allegedly Sought to Sway Votes.](#)” May 9, 2017. *Newsweek*.

²⁰¹Ann M. Simmons. “[Russia’s Meddling in Other Nation’s Elections is Nothing New: Just Ask the Europeans.](#)” March 30, 2017. *Los Angeles Times*.

²⁰²Andy Greenberg. 2017. “[How an Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar.](#)” June 20, 2017. *Wired*.

²⁰³To further polarize Ukrainian politics and contribute to strained ties with the West.

²⁰⁴With the war in the Donbass and the Russian seizure in Crimea, most parties competing in the election were not pro-Russia.

²⁰⁵Sabina Zawadzki. 2009. “[Moldova Communists win Parliamentary Election.](#)” April 6, 2009. *Reuters*.

²⁰⁶Dmitry Solovyov. “[Moldovan Communist Beaten in Landmark Election.](#)” July 29, 2009. *Reuters*.

²⁰⁷Jakob Tolstrup. 2014. *Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner): 239; Jakob Tolstrup. 2015. “[Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in Post-Soviet States.](#)” *European Journal of Political Research* 54(4): 686; Henry E. Hale. 2015. *Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press): 445.

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by PCRM
OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.
CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.
EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

2006

Belarus

DATE: March 19, 2006.
ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.
RESULTS: Victory by incumbent President Aleksandr Lukashenka with 84.4% of the vote.²⁰⁸

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The election was not competitive, as the government employed considerable fraud and manipulation and the results were greeted by mass protests.²⁰⁹

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia gave favorable media coverage to Lukashenka, Kremlin advisers aided the campaign, Moscow provided direct financial assistance, promised not to raise gas prices, and Federal Security Service (FSB) agents aided their Belarusian counterparts in targeting opposition groups.²¹⁰

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by Lukashenka
OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.
CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.
EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Partial.

2005

Moldova

DATE: March 6, 2005.
ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

²⁰⁸C. J. Chivers and Steven Lee Myers. "U.S. Calls Belarus Vote for Leader Invalid." March 21, 2006. *New York Times*.

²⁰⁹Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. "Republic of Belarus: Presidential Election: 19 March 2006." OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report. June 7, 2006 (Warsaw, Poland: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE); Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press): 200-1, 207-11.

²¹⁰ Andrew Wilson. 2011. *Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press): 209; Jakob Tolstrup. 2015. "Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in Post-Soviet States." *European Journal of Political Research* 54(4): 684.

RESULTS: The ruling Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) won a majority of seats.²¹¹

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The PCRM held 71 of 101 seats since the 2001 election, a margin which dropped to 56 after 2005.

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia interfered against Voronin and the PCRM in the parliamentary elections.²¹²

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Prevent a PCRM victory as the party was running on a platform of EU integration.²¹³

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

2004

Ukraine

DATE: October 31, November 21, December 25, 2004.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.

RESULTS: After claiming victory in November runoff elections marred by fraud, mass protests ('the Orange Revolution') led to another runoff and victory by Viktor Yushchenko.²¹⁴

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Unable to run for a second term, incumbent President Kuchma promoted Viktor Yanukovich as his successor.

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia interfered "massively" on behalf of Kuchma's chosen successor, Viktor Yanukovich, providing somewhere between \$50 and \$600 million to his campaign.²¹⁵ Russian President Vladimir Putin held high profile meetings with and praised

²¹¹Nick Paton. "Communists Poised to Win Moldovan Poll - and Reject Russia." March 7, 2005. *The Guardian*.

²¹²Jakob Tolstrup. 2014. *Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner): 239.

²¹³Nick Paton. "Communists Poised to Win Moldovan Poll - and Reject Russia." March 7, 2005. *The Guardian*.

²¹⁴Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press): 114-15.

²¹⁵Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov. 2006. "Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution." in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*, eds. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace): 157; Jakob Tolstrup. 2015. "Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in Post-Soviet States." *European Journal of Political Research* 54(4): 681-82; Jakob Tolstrup. 2014. *Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner): 239; Lucan A. Way. 2015. *Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics* (Baltimore: Johns

Yanukovych on Ukrainian national television.²¹⁶

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by pro-Russian Yanukovych.
 OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.
 CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.
 EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

2002

Ukraine

DATE: March 31, 2002.

ELECTION TYPE: Parliamentary.

RESULTS: Victory by the opposition Our Ukraine bloc.²¹⁷

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: The election was widely seen as a referendum on Kuchma's tenure.²¹⁸

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Putin had "visited Ukraine more than any other country" and backed Kuchma with "highly publicized economic concessions."²¹⁹

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by pro-Kuchma parties.
 OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? No.
 CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.
 EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

Hopkins University Press): 66-67.

²¹⁶Jakob Tolstrup. 2015. "Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in Post-Soviet States." *European Journal of Political Research* 54(4): 681-82; Lucan A. Way. 2015. *Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 69; Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." January 10, 2018 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office): 67.

²¹⁷Michael Wines. "Leader's Party Seems to Slip in Ukraine." April 1, 2002. *New York Times*.

²¹⁸Michael Wines. "Leader's Party Seems to Slip in Ukraine." April 1, 2002. *New York Times*; Patrick E. Tyler. "Ukraine's Leader Struggles to Go Quietly." March 29, 2002. *New York Times*.

²¹⁹Lucan A. Way. 2015. *Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 64; Rosaria Puglisi. 2003. "Clashing Agendas? Economic Interests, Elite Coalitions and Prospects for Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine." *Europe-Asia Studies* 55(6): 840.

1996

Moldova

DATE: November 17, December 1, 1996.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.

RESULTS: Victory by Petru Lucinschi with 54% of the vote.

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Lucinschi faced the ruling PCRM party and its leader, incumbent President Mircea Snegur.

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia provided support for Lucinschi in the 1994 election.²²⁰

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by Lucinschi.

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.

CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.

EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

1994

Belarus

DATE: June 23, July 10, 1994.

ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.

RESULTS: Victory by Aleksandr Lukashenka over incumbent President Vyachaslau Kebich.

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: In the first round of voting, Kebich only received 17% of the vote to Lukashenka's 45. Kebich was surprised by his defeat in 1994 but ultimately had little public or elite support.²²¹

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia provided support for Kebich in the 1994 election including cheap energy meant to boost incumbent popularity.²²² However, "the Russians felt lukewarm about Kebich at best."²²³ Lukashenka did address the Russian Duma in May 1994 which "gave him an official seal of approval."²²⁴ LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by Kebich.

²²⁰Jakob Tolstrup. 2014. *Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner): 239.

²²¹Lucan A. Way. 2015. *Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 125-27.

²²²Interview with Stanislau Bahdankevich, former head of the National Bank. June 22, 2004. Minsk; Interview with Alejksandr Feduta, journalist. June 23, 2004. Minsk. Jakob Tolstrup. 2014. *Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner): 239.

²²³Andrew Wilson. 2011. *Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press): 159.

²²⁴Andrew Wilson. 2011. *Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press): 165; Lucan A. Way. 2015. *Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics*

OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Partially.
CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.
EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Low.

Ukraine

DATE: June 26, July 10, 1994.
ELECTION TYPE: Presidential.
RESULTS: Leonid Kuchma won 52.3% of the vote.

ELECTION DESCRIPTION: Incumbent president Leonid Kravchuk lost to his former Prime Minister.²²⁵

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION: Russia provided support for Kuchma in the 1994 election and Russian television, widely available in Ukraine, reflected “a complete bias in favor of Kuchma.”²²⁶

LIKELY RUSSIAN GOALS: Victory by Kuchma.
OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO RUSSIA? Yes.
CONGRUENCE OF RUSSIAN GOALS WITH MAJOR PARTIES? Yes.
EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPACT: Medium.

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 135.

²²⁵Lucan A. Way. 2015. *Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): 55-57.

²²⁶Taras Kuzio. 1996. “Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 12(2): 124; Dominique Arel. 1995. “Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?” *Nationalities Papers* 23(3): 611-12; Jakob Tolstrup. 2014. *Russia vs. the EU: The Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner): 239.